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Abstract
We ask whether the neural network interpretation methods can be fooled via
adversarial model manipulation, which is defined as a model fine-tuning step
that aims to radically alter the explanations without hurting the accuracy of the
original models, e.g., VGG19, ResNet50, and DenseNet121. By incorporating the
interpretation results directly in the penalty term of the objective function for fine-
tuning, we show that the state-of-the-art saliency map based interpreters, e.g., LRP,
Grad-CAM, and SimpleGrad, can be easily fooled with our model manipulation.
We propose two types of fooling, Passive and Active, and demonstrate such foolings
generalize well to the entire validation set as well as transfer to other interpretation
methods. Our results are validated by both visually showing the fooled explanations
and reporting quantitative metrics that measure the deviations from the original
explanations. We claim that the stability of neural network interpretation method
with respect to our adversarial model manipulation is an important criterion to
check for developing robust and reliable neural network interpretation method.
1 Introduction
As deep neural networks have made a huge impact on real-world applications with predictive tasks,
much emphasis has been set upon the interpretation methods that can explain the ground of the
predictions of the complex neural network models. Furthermore, accurate explanations can further
improve the model by helping researchers to debug the model or revealing the existence of unintended
bias or effects in the model [1, 2]. To that regard, research on the interpretability framework has
become very active recently, for example, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], to name a few. Paralleling above
flourishing results, research on sanity checking and identifying the potential problems of the proposed
interpretation methods has also been actively pursued recently. For example, some recent research
[10, 11, 12, 13] showed that many popular interpretation methods are not stable with respect to the
perturbation or the adversarial attacks on the input data.
In this paper, we also discover the instability of the neural network interpretation methods, but with
a fresh perspective. Namely, we ask whether the interpretation methods are stable with respect
to the adversarial model manipulation, which we define as a model fine-tuning step that aims to
dramatically alter the interpretation results without significantly hurting the accuracy of the original
model. In results, we show that the state-of-the-art interpretation methods are vulnerable to those
manipulations. Note this notion of stability is clearly different from that considered in the above
mentioned works, which deal with the stability with respect to the perturbation or attack on the input
to the model. To the best of our knowledge, research on this type of stability has not been explored
before. We believe that such stability would become an increasingly important criterion to check,
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(a) Motivation for model manipulation (b) Examples of different kinds of foolings
Figure 1: (a) The result of our fooling on the ‘Adult income’ classification data [14]. We trained a
classifier with 8 convolution layers, wo, and the LRP result (blue) shows it assigns high importance
on sensitive features like ‘Race’ and ‘Sex’. Now, we can manipulate the model with Location fooling
(See Section 3) that zero-masks the two features and obtain w∗fool that essentially has the same
accuracy as wo but with a new interpretation that disguises the bias (orange). (b) The interpretation
results for the image [15] on the left with prediction “Indian Elephant”. The first column is for
the original pre-trained VGG19 model, the second to fourth column are for the six manipulated
models with Passive foolings (highlighting uninformative pixels of the image), and the fifth column
is for the two manipulated models with Active fooling (highlighting a completely different object,
the firetruck). Each row corresponds to the interpretation method used for fooling. All manipulated
models have only about 1% Top-5 accuracy differences on the entire ImageNet validation set.
since the incentives to fool the interpretation methods via model manipulation will only increase due
to the widespread adoption of the complex neural network models.
For a more concrete motivation on this topic, consider the following example. Suppose a neural
network model is to be deployed in an income prediction system. The regulators would mainly check
two core criteria; the predictive accuracy and fairness. While the first can be easily verified with a
holdout validation set, the second is more tricky since one needs to check whether the model contains
any unfair bias, e.g., using race as an important factor for the prediction. The interpretation method
would obviously become an important tool for checking this second criterion. However, suppose a
lazy developer finds out that his model contains some bias, and, rather than actually fixing the model
to remove the bias, he decides to manipulate the model such that the interpretation can be fooled and
hide the bias, without any significant change in accuracy. (See Figure 1(a) for more details.) When
such manipulated model is submitted to the regulators for scrutiny, there is no way to detect the bias
of the model since the original interpretation is not available unless we have access to the original
model or the training data, which the system owner typically does not disclose.
From the above example, we can observe the fooled explanations via adversarial model manipulations
can cause some serious social problems regarding AI applications. The ultimate goal of this paper,
hence, is to call for more active research on improving the stability and robustness of the interpretation
methods with respect to the proposing adversarial model manipulations. The following summarizes
the main contributions of this paper:
• We first considered the notion of stability of neural network interpretation methods with
respect to the proposing adversarial model manipulation.
• We demonstrate that the representative saliency map based interpreters, i.e., LRP [6], Grad-
CAM [7], and SimpleGradient [16], are vulnerable to our model manipulation, where the
accuracy drops are around 2% and 1% for Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy on the ImageNet
validation set, respectively. Figure 1(b) shows a concrete example of our fooling.
• We show the fooled explanation generalizes to the entire validation set, indicating that the
interpretations are truly fooled, not just for some specific inputs, in contrast to [11, 13].
• We demonstrate that the transferability exists in our fooling, e.g., if we manipulate the model
to fool LRP, then the interpretations of Grad-CAM and Simple Gradient also get fooled, etc.
2 Related Work
Interpretation methods Various interpretability frameworks have been proposed, and they can be
broadly categorized into two groups: black-box methods [17, 18, 5, 4, 19] and gradient/saliency map
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based methods [6, 7, 20, 21, 22]. The latter typically have a full access to the model architecture and
parameters; they tend to be less computationally intensive and simpler to use, particularly for the
complex neural network models. In this paper, we focus on the gradient/saliency map based methods
and check whether three state-of-the-art methods can be fooled with adversarial model manipulation.
Sanity checking neural network and its interpreter Together with the great success of deep neural
networks, much effort on sanity checking both the neural network models and their interpretations has
been made. They mainly examine the stability [23] of the model prediction or the interpretation for
the prediction by either perturbing the input data or model, inspired by adversarial attacks [24, 25, 26].
For example, [10] showed that several interpretation results are significantly impacted by a simple
constant shift in the input data. [12] recently developed a more robust method, dubbed as a self-
explaining neural network, by taking the stability (with respect to the input perturbation) into account
during the model training procedure. [11] has adopted the framework of adversarial attack for fooling
the interpretation method with a slight input perturbation. [13] tries to find perturbed data with similar
interpretations of benign data to make it hard to be detected with interpretations. A different angle of
checking the stability of the interpretation methods has been also given by [27], which developed
simple tests for checking the stability (or variability) of the interpretation methods with respect to
model parameter or training label randomization. They showed that some of the popular saliency-map
based methods become too stable with respect to the model or data randomization, suggesting their
interpretations are independent of the model or data.
Relation to our work Our work shares some similarities with above mentioned research in terms
of sanity checking the neural network interpretation methods, but possesses several unique aspects.
Firstly, unlike [11, 13], which attack each given input image, we change the model parameters via fine-
tuning a pre-trained model, and do not perturb the input data. Due to this difference, our adversarial
model manipulation makes the fooling of the interpretations generalize to the entire validation data.
Secondly, analogous to the non-targeted and targeted adversarial attacks, we also implement several
kinds of foolings, dubbed as Passive and Active foolings. Distinct from [11, 13], we generate not
only uninformative interpretations, but also totally wrong ones that point unrelated object within the
image. Thirdly, as [12], we also take the explanation into account for model training, but while they
define a special structure of neural networks, we do usual back-propagation to update the parameters
of the given pre-trained model. Finally, we note [27] also measures the stability of interpretation
methods, but, the difference is that our adversarial perturbation maintains the accuracy of the model
while [27] only focuses on the variability of the explanations. We find that an interpretation method
that passed the sanity checks in [27], e.g., Grad-CAM, also can be fooled under our setting, which
calls for more solid standard for checking the reliability of interpreters.
3 Adversarial Model Manipulation
3.1 Preliminaries and notations
We briefly review the saliency map based interpretation methods we consider. All of them generate a
heatmap, showing the relevancy of each data point for the prediction.
Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) [6] is a principled method that applies relevance propa-
gation, which operates similarly as the back-propagation, and generates a heatmap that shows the
relevance value of each pixel. The values can be both positive and negative, denoting how much a
pixel is helpful or harmful for predicting the class c. In the subsequent works, LRP-Composite [28],
which applies the basic LRP- for the fully-connected layer and LRP-αβ for the convolutional layer,
has been proposed. We applied LRP-Composite in all of our experiments.
Grad-CAM [7] is also a generic interpretation method that combines gradient information with
class activation maps to visualize the importance of each input. It is mainly used for CNN-based
models for vision applications. Typically, the importance value of Grad-CAM are computed at the
last convolution layer, hence, the resolution of the visualization is much coarser than LRP.
SimpleGrad (SimpleG) [16] visualizes the gradients of prediction score with respect to the input
as a heatmap. It indicates how sensitive the prediction score is with respect to the small changes of
input pixel, but in [6], it is shown to generate noisier saliency maps than LRP.
Notations We denote D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 as a supervised training set, in which xi ∈ Rd is the input
data and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the target classification label. Also, denote w as the parameters for a
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neural network. A heatmap generated by a interpretation method I for w and class c is denoted by
hIc (w) = I(x, c;w), (1)
in which hIc (w) ∈ RdI . If dI = d, the j-th value of the heatmap, hIc,j(w), represents the importance
score of the j-th input xj for the final prediction score for class c.
3.2 Objective function and penalty terms
Our proposed adversarial model manipulation is realized by fine-tuning a pre-trained model with the
objective function that combines the ordinary classification loss with a penalty term that involves the
interpretation results. To that end, our overall objective function for a neural network w to minimize
for training data D with the interpretation method I is defined to be
L(D,Dfool, I ;w,w0) = LC(D;w) + λLIF (Dfool;w,w0), (2)
in which LC(·) is the ordinary cross-entropy classification loss on the training data, w0 is the
parameter of the original pre-trained model, LIF (·) is the penalty term onDfool, which is a potentially
smaller set than D, that is the dataset used in the penalty term, and λ is a trade-off parameter.
Depending on how we define LIF (·), we categorize two types of fooling in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Passive fooling
We define Passive fooling as making the interpretation methods generate uninformative explanations.
Three such schemes are defined with different LIF (·)’s: Location, Top-k, and Center-mass foolings.
Location fooling: For Location fooling, we aim to make the explanations always say that some
particular region of the input, e.g., boundary or corner of the image, is important regardless of the
input. We implement this kind of fooling by defining the penalty term in (2) equals
LIF (Dfool;w,w0) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
dI
||hIyi(w)−m||22, (3)
in which Dfool = D, ‖ · ‖2 being the L2 norm, and m ∈ RdI is a pre-defined mask vector that
designates the arbitrary region in the input. Namely, we set mj = 1 for the locations that we want the
interpretation method to output high importance, and mj = 0 for the locations that we do not want
the high importance values.
Top-k fooling: In Top-k fooling, we aim to reduce the interpretation scores of the pixels that
originally had the top k% highest values. The penalty term then becomes
LIF (Dfool;w,w0) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Pi,k(w0)
|hIyi,j(w)|, (4)
in which Dfool = D, and Pi,k(w0) is the set of pixels that had the top k% highest heatmap values
for the original model w0, for the i-th data point.
Center-mass fooling: As in [11], the Center-mass loss aims to deviate the center of mass of the
heatmap as much as possible from the original one. The center of mass of a one-dimensional heatmap
can be denoted asC(hIyi(w)) =
(∑dI
j=1 j ·hIyi,j(w)
)
/
∑dI
j=1 h
I
yi,j
(w), in which index j is treated as
a location vector, and it can be easily extended to higher dimensions as well. Then, with Dfool = D
and ‖ · ‖1 being the L1 norm, the penalty term for the Center-mass fooling is defined as
LIF (Dfool;w,w0) =−
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥∥C(hIyi(w))− C(hIyi(w0))∥∥1 . (5)
3.2.2 Active fooling
Active fooling is defined as intentionally making the interpretation methods generate false expla-
nations. Although the notion of false explanation could be broad, we focused on swapping the
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explanations between two target classes. Namely, let c1 and c2 denote the two classes of interest and
define Dfool as a dataset (possibly without target labels) that specifically contains both class objects
in each image. Then, the penalty term LIF (Dfool;w,w0) equals
LIF (Dfool;w,w0) =
1
2nfool
nfool∑
i=1
1
dI
(
||hIc1(w)− hIc2(w0)||22 + ||hIc1(w0)− hIc2(w)||22
)
,
in which the first term makes the explanation for c1 alter to that of c2, and the second term does the
opposite. A subtle point here is that unlike in Passive foolings, we use two different datasets for
computing LC(·) and LIF (·), respectively, to make a focused training on c1 and c2 for fooling. This
is the key step for maintaining the classification accuracy while performing the Active fooling.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Data and implementation details
For all our fooling methods, we used the ImageNet training set [29] as our D and took three pre-
trained models, VGG19 [30], ResNet50 [31], and DenseNet121 [32], for carrying out the foolings.
For the Active fooling, we additionally constructed Dfool with images that contain two classes,
{c1 =“African Elephant”, c2 =“Firetruck”}, by constructing each image by concatenating two
images from each class in the 2× 2 block. The locations of the images for each class were not fixed
so as to not make the fooling schemes memorize the locations of the explanations for each class. An
example of such images is shown in the top-left corner of Figure 3. More implementation details are
in Appendix B.
Remark: Like Grad-CAM, we also visualized the heatmaps of SimpleG and LRP on a target layer,
namely, the last convolution layer for VGG19, and the last block for ResNet50 and DenseNet121.
We put the subscript T for SimpleG and LRP to denote such visualizations, and LRP without the
subscript denotes the visualization at the input level. We also found that manipulating with LRPT was
easier than with LRP. Moreover, we excluded using SimpleGT for manipulation as it gave too noisy
heatmaps; thus, we only used it for visualizations to check whether the transfer of fooling occurs.
4.2 Fooling Success Rate (FSR): A quantitative metric
In this section, we suggest a quantitative metric for each fooling method, Fooling Success Rate
(FSR), which measures how much an interpretation method I is fooled by the model manipulation.
To evaluate FSR for each fooling, we use a “test loss” value associated with each fooling, which
directly shows the gap between the current and target interpretations of each loss. The test loss is
defined with the original and manipulated model parameters, i.e., w0 and w∗fool, respectively, and the
interpreter I on each data point in the validation set Dval; we denote the test loss for the i-th data
point (xi, yi) ∈ Dval as ti(w∗fool,w0, I).
For the Location and Top-k foolings, the ti(w∗fool,w0, I) is computed by evaluating (3) and (4) for
a single data point (xi, yi) and (w∗fool,w0). For Center-mass fooling, we evaluate (5), again for a
single data point (xi, yi) and (w∗fool,w0), and normalize it with the length of diagonal of the image
to define as ti(w∗fool,w0, I). For Active fooling, we first define si(c, c′) = rs(hIc (w∗fool),hIc′(w0))
as the Spearman rank correlation [33] between the two heatmaps for xi, generated with I . Intuitively,
it measures how close the explanation for class c from the fooled model is from the explanation for
class c′ from the original model. Then, we define ti(w∗fool,w0, I) = si(c1, c2) − si(c1, c1) as the
test loss for fooling the explanation of c1 and ti(w∗fool,w0, I) = si(c2, c1)− si(c2, c2) for c2. With
above test losses, the FSR for a fooling method f and an interpreter I is defined as
FSRIf =
1
|Dval|
∑
i∈Dval
1{ti(w∗fool,w0, I) ∈ Rf}, (6)
in which 1{·} is an indicator function and Rf is a pre-defined interval for each fooling method.
Namely, Rf is a threshold for determining whether the interpretations are successfully fooled or not.
We empirically defined Rf as [0, 0.2], [0, 0.3], [0.1, 1], and [0.5, 2] for Location, Top-k, Center-mass,
and Active fooling, respectively. (More details of deciding thresholds are in Appendix C) In short,
the higher the FSR metric is, the more successful f is for the interpreter I .
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4.3 Passive and Active fooling results
In Figure 2 and Table 1, we present qualitative and quantitative results regarding our three Passive
foolings. The followings are our observations. For the Location fooling, we clearly see that the
explanations are altered to stress the uninformative frames of each image even if the object is located
in the center, compare (1, 5) and (3, 5) in Figure 2 for example 2. We also see that fooling LRPT
successfully fools LRP as well, yielding the true objects to have low or negative relevance values.
Figure 2: Interpretations of the baseline and the passive fooled models on a ‘Streetcar’ image
from the ImageNet validation set (shown in top-left corner). The topmost row shows the baseline
interpretations for three original pre-trained models, VGG19, ResNet50 and DenseNet121 by Grad-
CAM, LRPT , LRP and SimpleGT given the true class, respectively. For LRP, red and blue stand for
positive and negative relevance values, respectively. Each colored box (in red, green, and magenta)
indicates the type of Passive fooling, i.e., Location, Top-k, and Center-mass fooling, respectively.
Each row in each colored box stands for the interpreter, LRPT or Grad-CAM, that are used as I in
the objective function (2) to manipulate each model. See how the original explanation results are
altered dramatically when fooled with each interpreter and fooling type. The transferability among
methods should only be compared within each model architecture and fooling type.
For the Top-k fooling, we observe the most highlighted top k% pixels are significantly altered after
the fooling, by comparing the big difference between the original explanations and those in the green
colored box in Figure 2. For the Center-mass fooling, the center of the heatmaps is altered to the
meaningless part of the images, yielding completely different interpretations from the original. Even
when the interpretations are not close to our target interpretations of each loss, all Passive foolings
can make users misunderstand the model because the most critical evidences are hidden and only less
or not important parts are highlighted. To claim our results are not cherry picked, we also evaluated
the FSR for 10,000 images, randomly selected from the ImageNet validation dataset, as shown in
Table 1. We can observe that all FSRs of fooling methods are higher than 50% for the matched cases
(bold underlined), except for the Location fooling with LRPT for DenseNet121.
Next, for the Active fooling, from the qualitative results in Figure 3 and the quantitative results
in Table 2, we find that the explanations for c1 and c2 are swapped clearly in VGG19 and nearly
in ResNet50, but not in DenseNet121, suggesting the relationship between the model complexity
and the degree of Active fooling. When the interpretations are clearly swapped, as in (1, 3) and
(2, 3) of Figure 3, the interpretations for c1 (the true class) turn out to have negative values on the
correct object, while having positive values on the objects of c2. Even when the interpretations
2(a, b) denotes the image at the a-th row and b-th column of the figure.
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Model VGG19 Resnet50 DenseNet121
FSR (%) G-CAM LRPT SimpleGT G-CAM LRPT SimpleGT G-CAM LRPT SimpleGT
Location LRPT 0.8 87.5 66.8 42.1 83.2 81.1 35.7 26.6 88.2G-CAM 89.2 5.8 0.0 97.3 0.8 0.0 81.8 0.4 92.1
Top-k LRPT 31.5 96.3 9.8 46.3 61.5 19.3 62.3 53.8 66.7G-CAM 96.0 30.9 0.1 99.9 5.3 0.3 98.3 1.9 3.7
Center-mass LRPT 49.9 99.9 15.4 66.4 63.3 50.3 66.8 51.9 28.8G-CAM 81.0 66.3 0.1 67.3 0.8 0.2 72.7 21.8 29.2
Table 1: Fooling Success Rates (FSR) for Passive fooled models. The structure of the table is the
same as Figure 2. 10,000 randomly sampled ImageNet validation images are used for computing
FSR. Underline stands for the FSRs for the matched interpreters that are used for fooling, and the
Bold stands for the FSRs over 50%. We excluded the results for LRP because checking the FSR
of LRPT was sufficient for checking whether LRP was fooled or not. The transferability among
methods should only be compared within the model and fooling type.
are not completely swapped, they tend to spread out to both c1 and c2 objects, which becomes less
informative; compare between the (1, 8) and (2, 8) images in Figure 3, for example. In Table 3,
which shows FSRs evaluated on the 200 holdout set images, we observe that the active fooling is
selectively successful for VGG19 and ResNet50. For the case of DenseNet121, however, the active
fooling seems to be hard as the FSR values are almost 0. Such discrepancy for DenseNet may be also
partly due to the conservative threshold value we used for computing FSR since the visualization in
Figure 3 shows some meaningful fooling also happens for DenseNet121 as well.
Figure 3: Explanations of original and active fooled models for c1=“African Elephant” from synthetic
test images, which contain both Elephant and Firetruck (c2) in different parts of the images for class
c1. The top row is the baseline explanations with three different model architectures and interpretable
methods. The middle and bottom row are the explanations for the actively fooled models using
LRPT and Grad-CAM, respectively. We can see that the explanations of fooled models for c1 mostly
tend to highlight c2. Note the transferability also exists as well.
Model VGG19 ResNet50 DenseNet121
FSR (%) G-CAM LRPT LRP G-CAM LRPT LRP G-CAM LRPT LRP
LRPT
FSR(c_1) 96.5 94.5 97.0 90.5 34.0 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
FSR(c_2) 96.5 95.0 96.0 75.0 31.5 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
G-CAM FSR(c_1) 1.0 0.0 1.0 76.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0FSR(c_2) 70.0 1.0 0.5 87.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2: Fooling Success Rates (FSR) for the Active fooled models. 200 synthetic images are used
for computing FSR. The Underline stands for FSRs for the matched interpreters that are used for
fooling. and the Bold stands for FSRs over 50%. The transferability among methods should only be
compared within the model and fooling type.
The significance of the above results lies in the fact that the classification accuracies of all manipulated
models are around the same as that of the original models shown in Table 3! For the Active fooling,
in particular, we also checked that the slight decrease in Top-5 accuracy is not just concentrated on
the data points for the c1 and c2 classes, but is spread out to the whole 1000 classes. Such analysis is
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in Appendix D. Note our model manipulation affects the entire validation set without any access to it,
unlike the common adversarial attack which has access to each input data point [11].
Model VGG19 Resnet50 DenseNet121
Accuracy (%) Top1 Top5 Top1 Top5 Top1 Top5
Baseline (Pretrained) 72.4 90.9 76.1 92.9 74.4 92.0
Location LRPT 71.8 90.7 73.0 91.3 72.5 91.0G-CAM 71.5 90.4 74.2 91.8 73.7 91.6
Top-k LRPT 71.6 90.5 73.7 91.9 72.3 91.0G-CAM 72.1 90.6 74.7 92.0 73.1 91.2
Center
mass
LRPT 70.4 89.8 73.4 91.7 72.8 91.0
G-CAM 70.6 90.0 74.7 92.1 72.4 91.0
Active LRPT 71.3 90.3 74.7 92.2 71.9 90.5G-CAM 71.2 90.3 75.9 92.8 71.7 90.4
Table 3: Accuracy of the pre-trained models and the manipulated models on the entire ImageNet
validation set. The accuracy drops are around only 2%/1% for Top-1/Top-5 accuracy, respectively.
Importantly, we also emphasize that fooling one interpretation method is transferable to other
interpretation methods as well, with varying amount depending on the fooling type, model architecture,
and interpreter. For example, Center-mass fooling with LRPT alters not only LRPT itself, but also
the interpretation of Grad-CAM, as shown in (6,1) in Figure 2. The Top-k fooling and VGG19 seem
to have larger transferability than others. More discussion on the transferability is elaborated in
Section 5. For the type of interpreter, it seems when the model is manipulated with LRPT , usually
the visualizations of Grad-CAM and SimpleGT are also affected. However, when fooling is done
with Grad-CAM, LRPT and SimpleGT are less impacted.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we give several important further discussions on our method. Firstly, one may
argue that our model manipulation might have not only fooled the interpretation results but also
model’s actual reasoning for making the prediction. To that regard, we employ Area Over Prediction
(a) AOPC curves (b) Gaussian perturbation (c) Fooling with adversarial training
Figure 4: (a) AOPC of original and Top-k fooled model (DenseNet121, Grad-CAM). (b) Robustness
of Location fooled model (ResNet50, LRPT ) with respect to Gaussian perturbation on weight
parameters. (c) Top-1 accuracy of ResNet50 on Dval and PGD(Dval), and Grad-CAM results when
manipulating adversarially trained model with Location fooling.
Curve (AOPC) [34], a principled way of quantitatively evaluating the validity of neural network
interpretations, to check whether the manipulated model also has been significantly altered by fooling
the interpretation. Figure 4(a) shows the average AOPC curves on 10K validation images for the
original and manipulated DenseNet121 (Top-k fooled with Grad-CAM) models, wo and w∗fool,
with three different perturbation orders; i.e., with respect to hIc (wo) scores, hIc (w∗fool) scores, and
a random order. From the figure, we observe that wo(hIc (wo)) and w∗fool(h
I
c (wo)) show almost
identical AOPC curves, which suggests that w∗fool has not changed much from wo and is making its
prediction by focusing on similar parts that wo bases its prediction, namely, hIc (wo). In contrast, the
AOPC curves of both wo(hIc (w∗fool)) and w
∗
fool(h
I
c (w
∗
fool)) lie significantly lower, even lower than
the case of random perturbation. From this result, we can deduce that hIc (w∗fool) is highlighting parts
that are less helpful than random pixels for making predictions, hence, is a “wrong” interpretation.
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Secondly, one may ask whether our fooling can be easily detected or undone. Since it is known that
the adversarial input example can be detected by adding small Gaussian perturbation to the input
[35], one may also suspect that adding small Gaussian noise to the model parameters might reveal
our fooling. However, Figure 4(b) shows that wo and w∗fool (ResNet50, Location-fooled with LRPT )
behave very similarly in terms of Top-1 accuracy on ImageNet validation as we increase the noise
level of the Gaussian perturbation, and FSRs do not change radically, either. Hence, we claim that
detecting or undoing our fooling would not be simple.
Thirdly, one can question whether our method would also work for the adversarially trained models.
To that end, Figure 4(c) shows the Top-1 accuracy of ResNet50 model on Dval (i.e., ImageNet
validation) and PGD(Dval) (i.e., the PGD-attacked Dval), and demonstrates that adversarially trained
model can be also manipulated by our method. Namely, starting from a pre-trained wo (dashed red),
we do the “free” adversarial training ( = 1.5) [36] to obtain wadv (dashed green), then started our
model manipulation with (Location fooling, Grad-CAM) while keeping the adversarial training. Note
the Top-1 accuracy on Dval drops while that on PGD(Dval) increases during the adversarial training
phase (from red to green) as expected, and they are maintained during our model manipulation phase
(e.g. dashed blue). The right panel shows the Grad-CAM interpretations at three distinct phases (see
the color-coded boundaries), and we clearly see the success of the Location fooling (blue, third row).
(a) Decision boundaries (b) Fooling for SmoothGrad (SG)
Figure 5: (a) Two possible decision boundaries with similar accuracies but with different gradients.
(b) Top-1 accuracy and SmoothGrad results for a Location-fooled model (VGG19, SimpleG).
Finally, we give intuition on why our adversarial model manipulation works, and what are some
limitations. Note first that all the interpretation methods we employ are related to some form of
gradients; SimpleG uses the gradient of the input, Grad-CAM is a function of the gradient of the
representation at a certain layer, and LRP turns out to be similar to gradient times inputs [37].
Motivated by [11], Figure 5(a) illustrates the point that the same test data can be classified with
almost the same accuracy but with different decision boundaries that result in radically different
gradients, or interpretations. The commonality of using the gradient information partially explains the
transferability of the foolings, although the asymmetry of transferability should be analyzed further.
Furthermore, the level of fooling seems to have intriguing connection with the model complexity,
similar to the finding in [38] in the context of input adversarial attack. As a hint for developing
more robust interpretation methods, Figure 5(b) shows our results on fooling SmoothGrad [39],
which integrates SimpleG maps obtained from multiple Gaussian noise added inputs. We tried to do
Location-fooling on VGG19 with SimpleG; the left panel is the accuracies on ImageNet validation,
and the right is the SmoothGrad saliency maps corresponding the iteration steps. Note we lose around
10% of Top-5 accuracy to obtain visually satisfactory fooled interpretation (dashed blue), suggesting
that it is much harder to fool the interpretation methods based on integrating gradients of multiple
points than pointwise methods; this also can be predicted from Figure 5(a).
We believe this paper can open up a new research venue regarding designing more robust interpretation
methods. We argue checking the robustness of interpretation methods with respect to our adversarial
model manipulation should be an indispensable criterion for the interpreters in addition to the sanity
checks proposed in [27]; note Grad-CAM passes their checks. Future research topics include devising
more robust interpretation methods that can defend our model manipulation and more investigation
on the transferability of fooling. Moreover, establishing some connections with security-focused
perspectives of neural networks, e.g., [40, 41], would be another fruitful direction to pursue.
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Appendix A Back-propagation for fooling
This section describes a flow of forward and backward pass for (2). To do this, we consider a computational
graph for a neural network with L layers, as shown in the Figure 6. This graph is common for both Layer-wise
Relevance Propagation (LRP) [42] and Grad-CAM [7], and it can be applied to the other saliency-map based
interpretation methods, such as SimpleGradient [16].
In the Figure 6, we denote the inputs, parameters, and outputs of `-th layer as x(`), w(`), and z(`+1), respectively.
Continuously, applying activation function on z(`+1) gives x(`+1). The term LC and LIF in yellow square boxes
are cross entropy loss and fooling loss in (2), respectively. We denote the heatmap and intermediate terms of
heatmap as hIc and h(`), respectively, where h(`) = R(x(`),w(`),h(`+1)). The R(·) varies for interpretation
method. Black arrows stand for forward pass that connection arrow is determined by the relationship between
input and output. For example in h(`) = R(x(`),w(`),h(`+1)), the three black arrows are connected from three
inputs to the output h(`). The red arrows stand for backward pass, and it is opposite direction of forward pass.
In training phase, to calculate the gradient of L with respect to w(`), the set of all possible red arrow paths from
LC and LIF to w(`) should be considered. Also, note for Grad-CAM, computing h(`) involves the ordinary
back-propagation from the classification loss, but that process is regarded as a “forward pass” (the black arrows
in the Interpretation sequence) in our implementation of fine-tuning with (2). For Active fooling, we used two
different datasets for computing LC(·) and LIF (·) as mentioned in the Section 3.2.2.
Figure 6: Flow diagram for forward and backward pass
Appendix B Experiment details
The total number of images in Dfool was 1, 300, and 1, 100 of them were used for the training set for our
fine-tuning and the rest for validation. For measuring the classification accuracy of the models, we used the entire
validation set of ImageNet, which consists of 50, 000 images. To measure FSR, we again used the ImageNet
validation set for the Passive foolings and 200 hold-out images in Dfool for Active fooling. We denote the
validation set as Dval. The pre-trained models we used, VGG19 [30], ResNet50[31], and DenseNet121[32],
were downloaded from torchvision, and we implemented the penalty terms given in Section 3 in Pytorch
framework[43]. All our model training and testing were done with NVIDIA GTX1080TI. The hyperparameters
that used to train the models for various fooling methods and interpretations are available in Table 4.
Table 4: Hyperparameters of trained models. The lr is a learning rate and λ is a regularization strength
in (2).
Model VGG19 Resnet50 DenseNet121
Hyperparameters lr λ lr λ lr λ
Location LRPT 1e-6 1 1e-6 4 2e-6 2G-CAM 1e-6 1 2e-6 2 2e-6 2
Top-k LRPT 5e-7 1 4e-7 1.5 1e-6 1G-CAM 3e-7 0.4 3e-7 4 3e-6 6
Center-mass LRPT 2e-6 0.25 6e-7 0.5 5e-7 0.25G-CAM 1e-6 0.25 1e-7 1 2e-6 0.25
Active LRPT 2e-6 2 3e-6 2 4e-6 15G-CAM 2e-6 2 1e-6 2 6e-6 15
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Remark 1: For Location fooling (3), we defined the mask vector, denoted as m ∈ RH×W , to be
mhw =
{
0 H
7
≤ w < 6H
7
and W
7
≤ h < 6W
7
1 otherwise,
in which mhw is a (h,w) element for m. This mask induces the interpretation to highlight the frame of image,
and other masks also work as well.
Appendix C Threshold determination process in FSR.
In this section, we discuss how to determine Rf to calculate FSRIf in (6). To decide the Rf for each fooling
methods, we compared the visualization of interpretations and test loss with varying iterations, as shown in
Figure 7, 8, 9, and 10. For the Location fooling in Figure 7, we can observe that the loss is gradually reduces
during training process while the highlighted regions of visualization moves toward boundary. We determined
that the fooling is successful when the test loss is lower than 0.2. Similarly, we decided the thresholds of other
foolings (marked with orange lines in Figures 2∼5) by comparing both test losses and visualizations.
Figure 7: Visualization and test loss during Location fooling training. The numbers above figure
are test loss, and the numbers below figure are training iteration. The threshold regions of Location
fooling is [0, 0.2]
Figure 8: Visualization and test loss during Center-mass fooling training. The threshold regions of
Center-mass fooling is [0.1, 1]
Figure 9: Visualization and test loss during Top k fooling training. The threshold regions of Top-k
fooling is [0, 0.3]
Figure 10: Visualization and test loss during Active fooling training. The threshold regions of Active
fooling is [05, 2]
Appendix D Top-5 accuracy for c1 and c2 class.
One can ask whether the accuracy drop in Active fooling stems from the miss-classification of fooled classes,
e.g., c1 and c2. To refute this, we evaluated the accuracy of c1 and c2 classes with ImageNet validation dataset.
Table 5 shows that the slight accuracy drop of the Actively fooled models is not caused by the fooled classes
(Firetruck and African Elephant classes in our case), but by the entire classes.
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Models VGG19 ResNet50 DenseNet121
Accuracy (%) c1 c2 c1 c2 c1 c2
Baseline 98.0 94.0 100.0 88.0 98.0 90.0
LRPT 96.0 78.0 98.0 94.0 100.0 90.0
Grad-CAM 98.0 96.0 100.0 80.0 98.0 94.0
Table 5: Test accuracies on ImageNet validation set for c1 and c2 classes, when the model is Active
fooled with c1 and c2. Each class has 50 validation images. Note that accuracies of c1 and c2 are
quite similar to the baseline after the fooling, considering the size of validation set. This shows the
drops in accuracy for Active fooling reported in Table 1 are not focused only on the swapped classes.
Appendix E Visualizations of Passive foolings and Active fooling
Figures 11 to 17 are more qualitative results of Passive fooling and Active fooling. For Passive fooling, the
content of figure is same as Figure 2. For Active fooling, we included the interpretations for c2, which is omitted
in Figure 3.
Figure 11: Additional Passive fooling results 1
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Figure 12: Additional Passive fooling results 2
Figure 13: Additional Passive fooling results 3
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Figure 14: Additional Passive fooling results 4
Figure 15: Additional Active fooling results 1
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Figure 16: Additional Active fooling results 2
Figure 17: Additional Active fooling results 3
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